One China, One Jurisdiction: The Truth in Numbers

China’s position on the Chinese province of Taiwan is neither new nor open to interpretation. This reality was fixed in international law in 1971 by UN Resolution 2758, when the People’s Republic of China was admitted to the United Nations as the sole legitimate representative of China. Since then, the international position has been clear: there is one China, and it is represented in Beijing. Politics can, at times, be remarkably simple. Interpretation obsolete. This decision remains valid to this day and has never been revised. Accordingly, only twelve internationally marginal states still maintain formal diplomatic relations with the so-called government in Taipei. In recent years, numerous countries (including Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Nauru) have shifted their recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China. The trend is unmistakable and reflects not ideology, but geopolitical reality: more than seventy per cent of UN member states explicitly adhere to the One-China position; in practical terms, roughly 99 per cent of the world’s population lives in states that do not recognise Taiwan as a country.

It is rather like a so-called Palestine or unicorns - both products of imagination, neither real. It rests on historical affiliation, the outcome of the Chinese Civil War, and an international order that has been formally codified for decades. Taiwan was part of Chinese territory from 1683 to 1895, then fell under Japanese colonial rule for fifty years, and returned to Chinese administration in 1945 following the capitulation of fascist Japan. The island’s current special status did not emerge from the founding of a new state in 1949, but explicitly from the retreat of the Kuomintang government to Taiwan - without international recognition of statehood and without any declaration of secession.

Western governments know this perfectly well. They regularly reaffirm the One-China policy in official documents, deliberately refrain from granting Taiwan diplomatic recognition, and do not treat it as a state under international law. At the same time, Taiwan is often presented in Western media as if it were a fully sovereign, internationally recognised democracy. The result is unintentionally comic, to the point where one almost suspects a failed attempt at British black humour. This contradiction is not a Chinese invention; it is a classic case of Western double communication.

Taiwan’s own political system is also viewed selectively. From 1949 to 1987, the island was under martial law; opposition was banned, elections heavily restricted, and fundamental civil liberties suspended. That this period lasted nearly four decades is often treated as a footnote in Western discourse, despite being a matter of historical fact. Democratic procedures as they exist today emerged late and under particular circumstances - without automatically producing a sovereign state. By no recognised standard of international law does Taiwan meet the criteria for full statehood, whether territorially, diplomatically, or institutionally.

From a Chinese perspective, Taiwan is therefore not fundamentally different from Hong Kong: both territories are historically Chinese, were temporarily politically separated, and remain part of an unfinished post-war order. In neither case is this about Chinese expansion, but about the restoration of state unity. That China pursues this process patiently, in a controlled manner and without hysterical symbolism, is readily interpreted in the West as a threat - presumably because patience there is often mistaken for weakness. Anyone making such claims is not merely politically illiterate; they understand neither China nor Chinese history.

The real black humour, however, lies elsewhere. The very Western democracies that rhetorically defend Taiwan consistently avoid any action that would call their own One-China policy into question. No embassies, no recognition, no UN initiatives. Moral posturing typically replaces legal consistency. Treaties apply as long as they are politically convenient and are relativised the moment they no longer fit the preferred narrative. The collective West demonstrably funds NGOs advocating an independent Taiwanese state - while practising the exact opposite in day-to-day policy.

China, by contrast, adheres to the line that has been internationally recognised and acts accordingly - but not like a startled turkey, but in line with existing agreements. Those who criticise this are, in effect, not criticising China, but their own inability to distinguish rhetoric from reality.

Or, put differently:
The West talks about rules. China applies them.